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1 
Empirical Analysis Supports the Hayne Long Run Reform Thesis 
Abstract 
Australia has arguably benefited from its market based regulatory system and progressed 
toward its first objective of an entrepreneurial wealth creating society competing with its 
global peers; the second objective, being investment stability and risk mitigation, has for many 
people been an abject disaster.1 Proposed reforms to balance entrepreneurial market conduct 
with investor and beneficiary risk mitigation rely on themes established by Cooper2 (personal 
liability of superannuation trustee directors), Heydon3 (elimination of unhealthy culture), 
Hayne4 (confluence of law and morality) and the Productivity Commission5 (trust). The 
Australian government must act. It must do so strategically. It must establish the nexus 
between the intent of the law and its practical implementation for those it purports to serve. 
Parliament has yet to debate these underlying causes. If it does, then it must confront the 
distinction between fiduciary and non-fiduciary duties and recognise the power of fiduciary 
law. Confused parliamentary leadership has facilitated corruption of the regulatory system. 
These are philosophical as well as legal questions. Hayne points to the need for a framework 
for the re-integration of the intent and spirit of the law with its statutory manifestations. This 
paper is that framework. 
1 David G Millhouse, ‘Systemic and Cyclical Failure in Australian Financial Services and Financial Products 
Sectors: Have weaknesses in law contributed to these failures?’ (PhD Thesis, Bond University, 2019) 
ch 1 s 6. 
2 Jeremy Cooper, Review of the Governance, Efficiency, Structure, and operation of Australia’s 
Superannuation System (Commonwealth of Australia, 30 June 2010). 
3 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and Corruption (Interim Report,  
December 2014) 904 (Commissioner Heydon); Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Trade Union 
Governance and Corruption (Final Report, December 2015) ch 4, 10 (Commissioner Heydon). 
4 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial 
Services Industry (2018) (Commissioner Hayne).
5 Australian Government Productivity Commission, Competition in the Australian Financial System (Draft 
Report, January 2018); Australian Government Productivity Commission, Superannuation: Assessing 
Efficiency and Competitiveness (Report No 91, 2018). 





1.1  Four Strategic Themes 
The primary findings of empirical research give rise to four reform objectives ― re-establishment 
of trust in the investment chain based on fiduciary obligation; reform of related party transactions, 
value shifting through tunnelling and conflicts of interest; financial system architecture for 
implementation at the financial consumer level ― financial planning and wealth management as a 
profession; and market conduct regulation for the 21st century (including ASIC reform). Within 
each reform theme tactical statutory support to remedy failures in disclosure, develop Australia as a 
world financial centre, and NBFE governance are essential for successful implementation. These 
themes provide the framework on which to implement Hayne’s longer term objectives.6 
1.2  The Four Ages 
The evolution of financial services and products regulation from 1981 to 2018 falls into four 
distinct periods, or Ages. These are: Deregulation and Entrepreneurship (1981–2001); Disquiet ― 
Failures in Implementation (2002–2009); Reaction (2010–2013); and Statutes (2014 et seq). Each 
of these Ages are distinctive and trace the tension between encouragement of entrepreneurship and 
protection of investors and beneficiaries. These tensions are evident in the development of the law 
and in the profusion of statutes, inquiries, commissions, and research reports published in each of 
these Ages. Judicial interpretation of consequential accretive statutory interventions, particularly the 
Corporations Act, is not always kind to the parliamentary draftsmen. 
A first theme from 1981-2018 has seen an increase in the number and size of statutes, often 
provoking judicial frustration and negative comment.7 Empirical analysis demonstrates that 
                                                 
6 Hayne (n 4) vol 1 494–496. 
7 Millhouse (n 1) see, eg, ch 1 n 38. 
 




legislation (the ‘Age of Statutes’)8 has not prevented manifestation of systemic problems or reduced 
their cyclical recurrence. Instead, it has created a large compliance industry with attendant direct 
and indirect costs. These costs are ultimately borne by beneficiaries and investors. They also 
manifest in market consolidation in attempts to capture economies of scale in an attempt to reduce 
unit costs to those investors and beneficiaries. Regulatory intervention into the superannuation 
sector requiring consolidation is an example. Statutory evolution has been and remains politically 
contested reducing its effectiveness as lobby groups masquerading as industry and professional 
associations pursue their particular interests.  
A second theme is the role of fiduciary duties. As Donald accurately points out, misuse of 
the adjective fiduciary by politicians and lobby groups has resulted in a mismatch of community 
expectations and the reality of fiduciary law in the Australian financial sector.9 Principles based 
general law has often provided the basis for the resolution of many specific cases in the empirical 
analysis. ‘Each of statute and equity influences the other [although] there is no judicial power to 
sunset some statutes as there is in the common law.10 In the meantime, 
It is ironic, then that those same political processes that are privileging these nobler qualities 
[of fiduciaries] are in fact de-coupling the regulatory regimes from the general law antecedents in 
which those qualities were initially expressed. Political processes are ensuring that what the law 
expects of Mason J’s quintessential fiduciaries, or at least those whose activities encroach on areas 
of public policy, are regulated by multi-layered, highly specific, bespoke regulatory regimes that 
largely eclipse the proscriptions and prescriptions of the general law.11 
                                                 
8 Mark Leeming, ‘Equity: Ageless in the “Age of Statutes”’ (2015) 9(2) Journal of Equity 108. 
9 M Scott Donald, ‘Regulating for fiduciary qualities of conduct’ (2013) 7(2) Journal of Equity 142 [1]. 
10 Leeming (n 8). 
11 Donald (n 9) 142 [2]. 
 




Accretive legislative change is not enough. Whilst ‘we now live in an age of statutes and not 
of the common law’,12 statutes have not eliminated systemic failures and their cyclical 
manifestations. ‘[C]omplying merely with the regulatory requirements may well leave the 
investment bank in breach of the fiduciary obligation’.13 In other words, compliance with the statute 
may expose a director to breaches of the general or case law on fiduciary obligations.14 Corruption 
rooted in cultural mores15 requires a rethink of assumptions of robustness in statutory 
construction’,16 and the adoption of ‘principles drawn from the law of trusts and from fiduciary 
law…’17 The statutes seek to manage whereas the solution is excision. Tuch concludes: ‘These 
problems are at the core of the structure of the financial markets’.18 Trustee standards are based on 
prohibition, not prioritisation, as is presently the case under the Corporations Act. This is one 
reason why the supremacy of fiduciary duties and trustee standards across the NBFE sector 
becomes manifestly important. 
1.3  Community Expectation ― The Search for Blame 
The Australian NBFE sector has been plagued with abhorrent and egregious conduct associated 
with related party transactions (RPTs) and consequential conflicts of economic interest. The 
                                                 
12 Paul Finn, ‘Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries’ (2010) 38 FLR 350. 
13 Andrew Tuch, ‘Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest’ (2005) 29 
Melbourne University Law Review 478, 515. 
14 In financial advice, see, eg, Simone Degeling and Jessica Hudson, ‘Fiduciary Obligations, financial 
advisers and FOFA’ (2014) 32 Companies and Securities Law Journal 527; Simone Degeling and 
Jessica Hudson ‘Equitable money remedies against financial advisers who give “advice about advice”’ 
(2015) 33 Companies and Securities Law Journal 166. 
15 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and Corruption (Final Report, 
December 2015) (Commissioner Heydon). 
16 Finn, ‘Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries’ (n 12) 336. 
17 Ibid 335. 
18 Tuch (n 13) 516. 
 




conduct may not strictly amount to legal malfeasance. Statutes and contracts are focussed on legal 
rights and interests rather than investor value outcomes. Correlation analysis of 199 senior court 
judgments demonstrates Australian propensity for related party transactions and their 
consequences.19 Notably, other professions are limited in respect of related party conduct. It is one 
of the factors preventing Australia from having a properly professional financial services sector.  
The scope and scale of financial damage, direct and indirect, led directly to community 
anger, political pressure, and to the search for remedies and scapegoats. Community expectations 
were different from market realities across much of the NBFE sector. Resulting economic hardships 
inevitably lead to emphasis on past losses. There is no broad public understanding of regulators’ 
mandates nor of the legal constraints under which they operate, particularly of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). There is unmet public expectation of a zero failure 
system. 
1.4  Australian Propensity for Misfeasance, Malfeasance and Non-Feasance 
‘The financial services industry is particularly vulnerable to the risk of international fraud’.20 The 
Australian Crime Commission noted that ‘Serious and Organised Investment Fraud is not an 
opportunistic crime, but a calculated, sophisticated, organised criminal event that can [attack] 
                                                 
19 Millhouse (n 1) ch 3 tab 3.25. Where related parties were involved, 93.42% of those same cases involved 
deceptive, misleading or unconscionable conduct; 95.31% involved dishonesty, and 100% involved 
breaches of directors’ duty. See also Australian Government Productivity Commission, Competition in 
the Australian Financial System (Draft Report, January 2018) ch 7 ‘Dominance through integration’, 
fig 7.1; ch 11 ‘General insurance providers’, fig 11.3. See also Kevin Yi Liu, Australian 
Superannuation: Operational Structure, Investment Performance and Trustee Governance (PhD 
Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2013) 166–176. 
20 Submission to Senate,  PJC, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the collapse of Trio Capital (2012), 
Australian Custodian Services Association 43 3. 
 




experienced investors…’21 Task Force Galilee was established in 2011 as a multi-agency response 
to these crime threats. Whilst serious, international frauds have been comparatively small and rare 
by comparison with investor losses arising from internal systemic failures quantified in the 
empirical analysis. 
Closer to home, there are many thousands of cases of egregious behaviour.22 These cases 
arose from financial products investment through the Wallis inspired processes of disclosure, 
financial advice, and assumptions of a financially literate clientele. Public pressure and judicial 
proceedings led inter alia to reviews of ASIC’s performance in 2014 and 2015,23 a further 
Parliamentary Inquiry into agribusiness MIS (Bitter Harvest),24 and the Financial System Inquiry25 
in 2014. For superannuation entities, a continuation of the Stronger Super26 agenda. The Heydon 
Royal Commission27 into registered organisations corruption paved the way for legislative reform 
of these systemically important entities, followed by Hayne in 2018. These cases demonstrate, with 
                                                 
21 Australian Crime Commission, Serious and Organised Investment Fraud in Australia (2012) 1. 
22 See, eg, Australian Government, The Senate Economics Reference Committee, Performance of the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (June 2014);  The Senate Economics Reference 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Agribusiness managed investment schemes ― Bitter Harvest 
(2016) chs 3, 31; 4, 37; 6, 75; 11 (‘Bitter Harvest’). 
23 Australian Government, The Senate Economics Reference Committee, Performance of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (June 2014); Karen Chester, Mark Gray, and David Galbally, 
‘Fit for the future: A capability review of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’ 
(Australian Government Treasury Report, December 2015). 
24 Senate Economics Reference Committee, Parliament of Australia, Agribusiness managed investment 
schemes ― Bitter Harvest (2016) chs 3, 31; 4, 37; 6, 75; 11 (‘Bitter Harvest’).  
25 David Murray, Financial System Final Report (Australia Treasury, 2014). 
26 Cooper (n 2). 
27 Heydon (n 3). 
 




the exception of consumer credit and superannuation default funds, that investors are often treated 
as capital providers rather than consumers.28 
Community expectation that ASIC can police every commercial transaction is unaffordable, 
undesirable and unachievable. Empirical analysis indicates ASIC to have been the plaintiff in 
approximately 64.32% of the cases in that analysis. ASIC’s responsibilities include inter alia more 
than 2.1 million companies, 490 Responsible Entities (RE’s), 861 custodians, more than 2,000 
trustee entities, more than 5,000 financial advice entities with 24,323 advisers.29 This mandate is 
proposed to be extended.30 However, it is ‘not feasible to contract [ex ante] for every 
contingency’.31 There is evidence that government lacks insight into ASIC’s need for governance 
and culture reform.32 It is not clear that ‘underfunding’ has been a problem,33 but there are 
dissenting views.34 Revenue has been reformed, but governance, financial allocations and human 
resources must follow function. Behavioural economics research casts substantial doubt on 
reformed ASIC funding systems. These are likely to prove costly to its clients and not address the 
                                                 
28 See, eg, Dimity Kingsford Smith, ‘ASIC Regulation for the investor as consumer’ (2011) 29 Companies 
and Securities Law Journal 327. 
29 Australian Government, Proposed Industry Funding Model for the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (Proposals Paper, November 2016). 
30 Australian Government Productivity Commission, Competition in the Australian Financial System (Draft 
Report, January 2018) ch 8 pt 17. 
31 Sven Hoeppner and Christian Kirchner, ‘Ex Ante versus Ex post Governance: A behavioural perspective’ 
(2016) 12(2) Review of Law and Economics 485, 232. 
32 Australian Government, Proposed Industry Funding Model for the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (Proposals Paper, November 2016) 4. 
33 Chester, Gray and Galbally (n 23) 13.  
34 See especially Pamela Hanrahan, ‘ASIC and managed investments’ (2011) 29 Companies and Securities 
Law Journal 297 and Dimity Kingsford Smith, ‘A harder nut to crack? Responsive Regulation in the 
financial services sector’ (2011) 44 (3) University of British Columbia Law Review 702. 
 




underlying systemic problem. ‘[S]uch regimes increase governance costs without reducing the 
residual governance problems.’35 
1.5  Statutory Reform through the Ages 
Statutory reform has materially evolved the nature of regulation of financial products and financial 
services that largely subsume general law principles even as they employ similar language. ‘We live 
in the ‘Age of Statutes’.36 Insightfully, the intrusion of statute ‘is all too evident in both the FoFA 
and Stronger Super reforms. It is manifest in the sheer number of provisions that have been required 
to achieve a small number of easily articulated objectives’.37 ‘The provisions relating to the 
prohibition of certain types of “conflicted remuneration” are particularly Byzantine’.38 
Future of Financial Advice (FoFA) is ‘a tragedy’, a ‘means of [financial] product 
distribution’. ASIC ‘needs a big shake-up with high calibre people’, is subject to ‘cronyism’ with 
‘ideology over-riding facts’, ‘just doesn’t get it’, and ‘powerless to act against known malfeasors’. 
These are personal views of interviewees who participated in the qualitative research. Top decile 
and quartile empirical analysis quantifying investor losses and their causes provides holistic support 
for such excoriating criticism. Such criticisms should not be restricted to ASIC. It is restricted by its 
mandate and by parliamentary drafting of relevant statutes. The Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA) and the Fair Work Commission (FWC), perhaps because of their much smaller 
stakeholder groups, were not subjected to such invective despite stated concerns of political 
influence and accountability. 
                                                 
35 Hoeppner and Kirchner (n 31) 249. 
36 Dimity Kingsford Smith, ‘Is “due diligence” dead? Financial Services and products disclosure under the 
Corporations Act’ (2004) 22 Company and Securities Law Journal 130. 
37 Donald (n 9) 142 [3]. 
38 Ibid [1]. 
 




Suggested solutions39 include overwhelming support for a better culture, extension of 
fiduciary obligation to all parts of the investment chain, financial planners as educators, university 
standard training for directors and trustees, reform of ASIC’s operations, Canadian style Self-
Regulatory Organisation (SRO) architecture, and an independent arbiter to reduce reliance on the 
courts.40 
Resolution also includes emulation of models and standards from other jurisdictions which 
themselves have dealt with similar systemic failures. There are examples where professional and 
industry associations are quasi-regulators working from the bottom up, educative and consultative, 
thereby reducing inexhaustible demands for market conduct services from the central regulator, 
making for more effective ‘Responsive Regulation’.41 Scholarly research has demonstrated the 
difference between compliance based cultures and values based cultures and how ‘assumptions of 
rationality in economic theory are contradicted by experimental evidence’.42 This is important 
behavioural economics research with global multi-jurisdictional implications43 but receiving only 
limited scholarly attention in Australia.  
The basis of necessary infrastructure exists in Australia today. Ipso facto, ASIC can become 
ex ante and supervisory rather than ex post and reactive, its present posture impractical even with 
huge additional resources. It can evolve to apply the lessons of Cooper, Heydon, Hayne and the 
Productivity Commission. Behavioural economics scholarly research supports this change in 
                                                 
39 From greater than 50% of respondents in each city. 
40 Administrative Appeals Tribunal and Takeovers Panel were cited as examples. 
41 Dimity Kingsford Smith, ‘A harder nut to crack? Responsive Regulation in the financial services sector’ 
(2011) 44(3) University of British Columbia Law Review 695, 702. 
42 Don Mayer, Anita Cava and Catharyn Baird, ‘Crime and Punishment (or the Lack Thereof) for Financial 
Fraud in the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: Reasons and Remedies for Legal and Ethical Lapses’ 
(2014) 51(3) American Business Law Journal 515, 534 citing Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The 
Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions (Harper Perennial, 2010). 
43 Mayer, Cava and Baird (n 42) 541. 
 




posture, regarding ex post strategies as ‘behaviourally dysfunctional’ requiring a ‘counterintuitive 
shift of rule-making competencies: from public to private ordering.’44 In effect, Responsive 
Regulation, presently given lip-service rather than practical implementation. ‘[I]t is doubtful 
whether [ex post] monitoring can be done cost effectively’.45 Evolution to an ex ante Responsive 
Regulation model requires discipline in those that implement it. The Damoclean Sword over 
improper conduct is to be provided by fiduciary obligation in the investment chain enforced by 
effective regulators and much greater levels of financial literacy. 
1.6  A Systemic Problem 
 ‘[R]elated party transactions are inherently problematic under any circumstances’46. They 
‘undermin[e] … fiduciary responsibility…47 RPTs ‘divert value from a corporation’.48 Their cousin, 
tunnelling, is the ‘transfer of resources out of a company [or other entity] to its controlling 
shareholder … [by] dominant shareholders and managers’.49 Prime Trust50 illustrates how value 
shifting by related parties can occur in Australia, its lawfulness contested in senior courts. Such 
deficiencies in the law strike directly at the veracity of Australia’s investment landscape.  
                                                 
44 Hoeppner and Kirchner (n 31) 227. 
45 Ibid 231. 
46 Duncan C Jessup, John H Farrar and Susan Watson, ‘Related Party Transactions in New Zealand: An 
Empirical Study of a Flawed System’ (2012) 30(2) Companies & Securities Law Journal 110, 113. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Luca Enriques, ‘Related Party Transactions: Policy Options and Real-World Challenges (with a Critique 
of the European Commission Proposal)’ (2015) 16 European Business Organization Law Review 1–2. 
49 Ibid 3. 
50 Lewski v ASIC (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 171 [190] (Greenwood, Middleton, and Foster JJ). 
 




Some argue that RPTs are in the best interest of the company but this laxity in regulation is 
a systemic failure leading directly to creeping corruption.51 Shareholder approval for a specific 
transaction easily leads to transfer of value and loss of control since only specific transactional 
approval is required, not approval of its long term value impact. RPTs are regulated using a number 
of legal tools, of varying efficacy and depend on the efficiency of enforcement. Prohibition of some 
transactions, including related party loans and loan guarantees used to gain control would be 
effective in some Australian creeping corruption cases, but may not be in the best interest of the 
company when the related party is the only willing participant. Selective prohibitions may be more 
pragmatic than a total prohibition.  
1.7  Comparative Insights 
The Untreue52 principle governs intent, now codified in EU law and supported by the German 
Corporate Governance Code as general law. German directors are required to observe the spirit and 
intent of the law, not only its statutory manifestations. EU regulation of related party transactions 
recognises they may have potential value, has not pursued the prohibition philosophy, provides for 
business judgment but balanced by codified civil law counterweights. This architecture reflects 
fiduciary stewardship concepts. This is not so in Australia unless there is a broadened fiduciary 
relationship where, as in the UK, ‘[i]t [creative compliance] is essentially the practice of using the 
letter of the law to defeat its spirit, and to do so with impunity’.53 
                                                 
51 In New Zealand it led to the complete collapse of its finance company sector: ‘almost 40% of all RPT’s are 
with executives…’ ‘The result is that New Zealand has been a relatively safe haven for Australian 
fraudsters’ quoted in Jessup, Farrar and Watson (n 46) 136–38. 
52 Luca Enriques, ‘Related Party Transactions: Policy Options and Real-World Challenges (with a Critique 
of the European Commission Proposal)’ (2015) 16 European Business Organization Law Review 1, 24. 
53 Simon Ashby, ‘The Turner Review on the Global Banking Crisis: A Response from the Financial Services 
Forum’ (Nottingham University, 2009) 17. 
 




The UK has, by widening director statutory responsibility to company long term success, 
introduced subjectivity. Disclosure, including the nature of the related party interest not just its 
existence, and prior fully informed consent of the disinterested members of the company form the 
basis of modern UK related party transaction governance.54  
Canadian regulation of financial advice requires consideration of whether a conflict may be 
‘expect[ed] to arise between the firm including each individual acting on behalf of the firm and its 
client’.55 Disclosure of itself is not sufficient. There must be a proactive business system of 
identifying conflicts of interest with prospective clients by the firm and participants in it, ‘consistent 
with the best interests of the client’.56 
1.8  Excision: Prohibition Not Prioritisation 
RPTs and tunnelling are so deep seated and problematic in Australian NBFEs that cultural change 
requires at least selective prohibition, not prioritisation. This excision should continue until 
governance practices demonstrably meet community expectations of trust and loyalty. ASIC needs 
RPT ex ante review and prevention powers, directly addressing the causes of systemic failure 
identified in the correlation analysis. The evolution of Australian superannuation law provides 
guidance although it still allows prioritisation. In the superannuation sector, ‘71% of retail funds … 
employ related-party service providers, compared with 52% of not-for-profit funds’, with differing 
patterns of ownership and control.57 ‘Extremely high levels of concentration are … exhibited in a 
number of outsourcing markets’,58 most particularly asset allocation consulting, audit, actuarial and 
                                                 
54 Companies Act 2006 (United Kingdom) s 200. 
55 National Instrument 31-103CP (Canada) pt 13.4. 
56 Approved Person responsibility to address conflicts of interest (Investment Industry Regulatory 
Organization of Canada) Rule 42.2. 
57 Kevin Yi Liu, ‘Australian Superannuation: Operational Structure, Investment Performance and Trustee 
Governance’ (PhD Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2013) 147. 
58 Ibid 167–8. 




custody. APRA’s ex ante supervisory posture and small number of supervised entities is a different 
proposition to the difficulties presently facing ASIC. ASIC will need data. This will be provided by 
each NBFE proactively developing their conflicts of interest register as part of lodgement of 
relevant offer documents and supporting related party contracts. Whilst not the same as notarisation 
and commercial court lodgement powers in German law, it would emulate that process extending 
contractual veracity to external independent review. 
Failure to disclose will result in loss of BJR protection under Corporations Act s 180(2)(b). 
It is a more stringent test than the present conflicts register which only requires disclosure of actual 
conflicts of interest. If these are reviewed at all, it is normally ex post. Different conflict of interest 
standards presently arise in NBFEs because of the fragmented statutory architecture: excision 
through prohibition will provide a period through which policy and statutory harmonisation can 
occur. 
For some vertically integrated NBFEs, this policy will be problematic, requiring divestment 
of controlled entities but an opportunity for directors to focus on their core business. 
  




2. Judicial Interpretations 
Legal analysis of cases which address the Wallis reform principles of financial advice and 
disclosure sustain these arguments. The cases refine the law applying to each of the Wallis 
principles. However, these cases, many of them useful, are piecemeal, primarily tactical and always 
after the fact (ex post). Rarely do they strike at the heart of the fundamental reason for systemic 
failure, namely statutory subsuming and deficient enforcement of fiduciary principles of loyalty in 
the investment chain.  
They do strike directly at a major reason for systemic failure, namely statutory complexity 
and uncertainty. Complexity and sheer volume of detail provide cover for creeping corruption (in 
UK terminology, creative compliance). Legal analyses of similar issues in like jurisdictions together 
with revelations from Australian case law provides a sound rationale for more stringency in policy 
sufficient to deter director and trustee malfeasance.  
2.1  Fiduciary Duty 
Fiduciaries concurrently exercise fiduciary and non-fiduciary duties. Contractual and other non-
fiduciary duties may co-exist with fiduciary duties. They should always be exercised to the benefit 
of the beneficiary.59 So, the sum of the duties exercised by a fiduciary are not the same as fiduciary 
duties. Whilst financial advisers have general law fiduciary duty to act in their clients’ interest, this 
is not the same as their best interest.60 Nor is it the same as the statutory overriding formulation 
relying on process rather than outcome.61 
                                                 
59 M Scott Donald, ‘“Best” interests?’ (2008) 2 Journal of Equity 253. 
60 Stephen Corones and Thomas Galloway, ‘The effectiveness of the best interests duty ― enhancing 
consumer protection?’ (2013) 41 Australian Business Law Review 5, 16. 
61 See Millhouse (n 1) ch 4 s 3.4. 
 




Acting in a positive way in satisfaction of the best interests duty is contested as non-
fiduciary in character (unlike the US and Canada),62 despite the obligation of fiduciary loyalty 
which ‘underlies and unifies other fiduciary duties’.63 As Finn opines, ‘[t]he scope, even the 
independent existence of, this duty are matters of contest in private law … [with] no uniformly 
agreed and accepted understanding of what the description ‘fiduciary powers’ signifies in private 
law’.64 
Recent judicial opinion suggests otherwise:65  
Positive, prescriptive duties may arise as a consequence of their being ‘no decision of which I 
am aware binding on this court to hold that the fiduciary duties of directors to their companies 
are so limited’66 [to proscriptive duties]. It is a matter of opinion as to what the law is.67 
Confusion reigns in the articulation of these principles in the terminology used by the legislature 
and subsequently in the media where fiduciary duty and best interest duty continue to be used 
interchangeably without distinguishing between proscriptive and prescriptive duties. This arises 
from recent context specific judicial interventions which should have limited holistic application to 
fiduciary duty in other broader contexts. It results in Australia becoming a legal outlier in fiduciary 
                                                 
62 Donald (n 59) 251; see also Corones and Galloway (n 60), 11. 
63 Rosemary Langford, ‘The Bona Fide Fiduciary Loyalty of Australian Company Directors’ (PhD Thesis, 
Monash University, 2013) 314 [1.1] citing Fitzsimmons v The Queen (1997) 23 ACSR 355. 
64 Finn, ‘Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries’ (n 12) 342–3 citing Geraint Thomas, ‘The Duty of Trustees to Act 
in the “Best Interest” of their Beneficiaries’ (2008) 2 Journal of Equity 177. See also John Lehane, 
‘Delegation of Trustees’ Powers and Current Developments in Investment Funds Management’ (1995) 
7 Bond Law Review 36. 
65 Babcock & Brown DIF 111 Global Co-Investment Fund, LP v Babcock & Brown International Pty 
Limited (No 2) [2017] VSC 556 [40] (Hargrave J); Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd 
(in liq) [No3] [2012] WASCA 157 [914], [1214] (Lee AJA, Drummond AJA, Carr AJA). 
66 Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq)(No3) [2012] WASCA 157 [1961] 
(Drummond AJA). 
67 Ibid [1976]–[1978]. 
 




law setting its jurisprudence apart from most comparative jurisdictions by significantly narrowing 
the definition and operation of fiduciary duty, relying on statutes which, as empirical analysis 
demonstrates, have manifestly failed those that they purportedly serve. 
Recent Australian jurisprudence restricted fiduciary duties to proscription. ‘[J]udicial 
thinking about the content of fiduciary duties has changed significantly over the last decade … 
[being to] confine the fiduciary component of the overall relationship to a number of specific 
duties’.68 Proscription requires restraint whereas prescription requires action (for obligatory duties) 
and positive actions for discretionary duties.69 
But the proscriptive nature of general law fiduciary duty is not a unanimous view:70 ‘[T]he 
law of this country does not otherwise impose positive legal duties on the fiduciary to act in the 
interests of the person to whom the duty is owed’,71 with Kirby J dissenting. 
A clear distinction between proscriptive and prescriptive duties may exist in some cases, but 
many situations could potentially be classified as involving duties of either kind … most but not 
necessarily all, fiduciary duties are proscriptive. However, it is dangerous to treat it as a 
talisman: it does not identify the reason for the existence (and hence the nature) of fiduciary 
duties.72 
Funds management entities, including promoters, and their directors are fiduciaries, although some 
                                                 
68 Aequitas v AEFC [2001] NSWSC 14 [283] (Austin J). 
69 Langford, ‘The duty of directors to act bona fide in the interests of the company’ (n 63) 219. 
70 Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) [2001] HCA 31 (Mc Hugh, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan, Kirby JJ).  
71 Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71 cited in Langford ‘The duty of directors to act bona fide in the 
interests of the company’ (n 63) 228. 
72 Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No3) [2012] WASCA 157 [1957] 
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‘major investment banks have indicated publicly their belief that they operate unconstrained by 
fiduciary obligations’.73 Where Managed Investment Schemes (MIS) are contractual rather than 
express trusts, that does not exclude the application of fiduciary principles, and a court may treat the 
relationship ‘as fiduciary under established principles of equity’.74 There is a tension between 
statutory prioritisation and fiduciary prohibitions, the result being whether an investment bank or 
funds manager ‘is obliged by fiduciary principles to avoid positions of conflict…’,75 or not. 
Fiduciary relationships can be created by reasonable expectation where the client relies on the 
advice proffered.76 Presently for wholesale investors in Australia, that relationship can be avoided 
by contract.77 For retail investors, it is subsumed by the Corporations Act.78 
Fiduciary standards mitigate malfeasance by reducing the power imbalance resulting from 
asymmetries of knowledge and comprehension. They align interests. Fiduciary law is more than 
‘legal polyfilla’79 requiring legitimate and reasonable client expectations of best interest to have 
primacy over contract. So who is categorised as a fiduciary has considerable importance to the 
investing community. ‘[A]ll of these are bound to the investor-beneficiaries by a web of fiduciary 
relationships both orthodox as well as unusual’.80 In a consolidating Australian NBFE market, these 
multiplicity of responsibilities are likely to become more widespread. 
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This single question of financial consumer trust in the investment chain should determine all 
future policy development and implementation. This includes financial literacy (presently the role 
of ASIC), the future of financial services and financial products provision. Capital markets for 
SME’s to increase industrial productivity and skilled employment, retirement incomes, and 
Australia’s future as a world financial centre substantially rely on it.  
2.2  Retail Financial Advice ― Simple Principles Subverted  
The statutory best interest duty in financial advice is prescriptive,81 including seven measures, and 
requires an appropriateness test for retail clients.82 These are ‘highly relevant to the Court’s 
assessment of compliance with the best interest duty’.83 They add to concepts of fiduciary duty in 
the same case, perhaps even subsuming them.84 ‘It is likely to be many years before the courts can 
interpret the content of the duty … will take many years and many cases before it is clear how the 
best interest duty operates85 … and greatly complicates the existing regime of protections’.86 ‘There 
does not appear to be any detailed consideration of the provisions that are the subject of this 
proceeding’,87 whilst applying Santow principles for breaches of them.88 Whilst the origin of the 
best interest duty is in equity, the statutory duty in retail financial advice is prescriptive and 
procedural. It may act to reduce or eliminate client equitable remedies.  
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[T]he statutory best interest provision is a long way from what equity understands the ‘best 
interest’ concept to mean, on even the narrowest view of that understanding. … The statutory 
best interest obligation is expressed as a series of steps to be undertaken, not as an obligation to 
prefer the client’s interest over the firm’s or to avoid the situations of conflict or collateral 
damage that fiduciary law proscribes … [and is] a significant departure from the best interest 
obligations that apply in equity to financial advisers.89 
It is process driven, not outcome driven, provides a safe haven for advisers,90 does not fulfil its 
original policy objectives of statutory fiduciary duty and therefore does not meet community 
expectations of what the law should mean. These include fiduciary obligations of undivided loyalty 
of financial and corporate advisers to their clients, and restorative remedies for breach. It further 
entrenches the doctrine of prioritisation over prohibition. ‘[I]t may operate to limit existing duties of 
financial advisers … apparently contrary to the intention of the post-GFC reforms’.91 Subsequent 
testing in 2017 provides the proof: 100% of advisers in the sample relied on the statutory safe 
harbour provision. 75% of those advisers claiming reliance on it did not comply with their statutory 
best interest duty with 10% leaving their client in a worse financial position.92 This is damning 
evidence of the subsuming of general law fiduciary obligation by compromised statute. Thus, 
expectations of fiduciary obligation create a false sense of security which is not met in practice. 
They arise from the politicisation of the debate: it is a sop, reflected in parliamentary commentary 
of the time.  
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90 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(2)(a)–(g). 
91 Hanrahan (n 89). 
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Accretive statutory change has bizarre results: 
[T]he new law applies to some financial services firms who are not fiduciaries with respect to 
the giving of that advice at general law. However, because of the narrow definition of retail 
client, many financial advisers who are fiduciaries (for example, the advisers in 
Wingecarribee93 and Bathurst94  are not subject to the new law.95 
2.3  Financial Advice ― Fiduciary Duty to Wholesale Clients with Retail Financial 
Literacy Competencies 
‘Abandon all hope, ye who enter here’.96 Wingecarribee Shire Council and other Australian local 
authorities, ‘Wingecarribee’97 and their compatriots in the UK and the US passed through these 
gates of hell. They suffered losses arising out of their acquisition of synthetic98 Collateralised Debt 
Obligations (CDO) and Credit Default Swaps (CDS), collectively (Dante Notes).99  
‘These products took hundreds of closely typed legally dense pages to document’.100 ‘A 
professional, in Grange’s position, does not discharge any duty of disclosure or adequately explain a 
complex transaction merely by giving its client a copy of voluminous documentation and inviting 
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95 Hanrahan (n 89). 
96 Allen Mandelbaum (trans), The divine comedy of Dante Alighieri: Inferno (Bantam Books, 1980). 
97 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 (Rares J). 
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99 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc v City of Swan [2010] HCA 11. These products were sold by Lehman Bros 
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the client to look at it, unaided by the professional…’101 Grange, on inquiry was ‘hardly candid’ 
about its remuneration, and its answers were ‘calculated to mislead and deceive’.102  
I do not accept Grange’s characterisation of its mere references in its selling materials to other 
documents that contained the full terms and conditions, including risk disclosures, as an attempt 
to provide the Councils, as clients, any substantive assistance to understand the underlying 
issues that may have affected the Councils’ investment decision-making. These documents were 
of a ‘byzantine’, or as Lord Mance said ‘purgatorial’ complexity.103… Grange had an obligation 
to make a full and accurate disclosure of its interest in the transaction and all that Grange knew 
with respect to the product, concealing nothing that might conceivably be regarded as relevant 
to the making of the investment decision.104 
None of the Councils had officers with any significant experience in financial products of this 
complexity. The Councils may have statutory typology of wholesale investors, but decision makers, 
drawn from the community, had retail financial literacy competencies.105 The Dante Notes were 
also the subject of litigation in the UK and the US. In the UK, the noteholders were given priority to 
collateral.106 In the US the result was the opposite, with the issuer having priority.107 The result 
being:  
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104 Ibid [728] (Rares J) citing Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd [1986] HCA 25. 
105 Grange promoted itself as a financial adviser with specific expertise in local government capital 
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understanding of the local government market that was unmatched in the financial markets’.  
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[A]s a result of certain conflicting claims and on-going legal proceedings, no distributions can 
be made to the holders of the Notes at this time …108 It will be some time before the United 
States Courts decide whether to follow the decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom…109 
‘This legal uncertainty’110 compounded the decision of the trustee to not make a distribution of 
collateral to the noteholders. The Federal Court (FCA) approved a settlement for the Councils in 
December 2015. 
The central feature of these legal relationships was a contract, the terms of which did not 
qualify the fiduciary character of the relationship, equity superimposing fiduciary obligations as an 
incidence of the relationship. ‘Indeed, the equitable remedies for a failure to discharge a fiduciary 
obligation may be greater than those available in the contract’.111 Pointing to the need for statutory 
reform: 
Grange had engaged in deceptive and misleading conduct contrary to what is now a plethora of 
pointlessly technical and befuddling statutory provisions scattered over many Acts in defined 
situations. The repealed, simple and comprehensive s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
that prohibited corporations engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct in trade or commerce 
has been done away with by a morass of dense, difficult to understand legislation. Those Acts, 
that now deal with misleading and deceptive conduct, apply differently depending on 
distinctions such as whether the alleged misleading conduct is in relation to a ‘financial product 
or a financial service’,112 or ‘financial services’.113 Those apparently simple terms are nothing of 
the sort. A ‘financial product’ is defined in mind-boggling detail in 7 pages of small type114 
while a ‘financial service’ takes another 6 pages to be defined.115 The ASIC Act only takes about 
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4 pages to define ‘financial service’.116 Obviously, there are differences in what each of these 
Acts and definitions cover – but why? The cost to the community, business, the parties, and 
their lawyers, and the time for courts to work out which law applies have no rational or legal 
justification.117 
Quite so: uncertainty continues: ‘[T]he application of the provisions defining financial products and 
financial services in this [Corporations Act] and other acts is often the cause of unnecessary 
distraction and confusion…’118 
Wingecarribee also pointed to another statutory reform need; there is no prudential 
supervision of Australian NBFEs other than insurance and superannuation entities.119 Grange could 
not meet its obligations to the Councils. 
Dante notes, on Grange’s admission, were 
suitable only for financial institutions and highly sophisticated professional investors who are 
capable of understanding … and who can absorb a substantial or total loss of principal. The 
Term Sheet is not intended for distribution to, or use by, private customers … such as the 
Councils.120 
What is the distinction between a financial product seller and the provision of financial product 
                                                 
116 Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12BAB. 
117 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 Summary 3 
(Rares J). 
118 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Davidof [2017] FCA 658 [4] (Lee J). 
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advice?121 This question arises constantly in NBFE financial product and financial advice markets 
for all typologies of investors. Peer professional opinion on this distinction is neither universal nor 
consistent.122 A redefinition of Corporations Act investor typology is needed. 
Bathurst123 was a similar case, being a triumph of promotion over the prudent investment of 
public funds. ‘Rembrandt was a grotesquely complicated product’.124 
2.4  Expectations ― Failures of Fiduciaries in Financial Advice ― Contracting Out  
Unlike Wingecarribee and Bathurst, where fiduciary relationships existed, Citigroup125 
demonstrated it is possible in Australia to contract out of fiduciary responsibility: it can be 
extinguished. 
[C]laims of conflict of interest and duty and breach of s 912A(1)(aa) depended on the existence 
of a fiduciary relationship … the claims failed because the letter of engagement under which 
Toll retained Citigroup as its adviser specifically excluded the existence of such a relationship. 
The Court held that the law does not prevent an investment bank from contracting out of a 
fiduciary capacity; whether it should be able to do so is a matter for the legislature, not the 
courts.126 
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Claims of misleading and deceptive conduct and unconscionable conduct127 failed for similar 
reasons. Thus, equitable remediation applied in Wingecarribee and Bathurst could not be achieved. 
The ‘relationship between the client and the investment bank engaged to advise on a 
takeover is fiduciary in character’,128 but ‘investment banks have developed contractual techniques 
to modify or displace fiduciary obligations’.129  
The critical matter in the end is the role that the alleged fiduciary has, or should be taken to 
have, in the relationship. It must so implicate that party in the other’s affairs or so align him 
with the protection or advancement of that other’s interest that foundation exists for the 
‘fiduciary expectation’.130 
‘Should be taken to have’ is the key to the mismatch between community expectation and practice, 
not satisfactorily addressed by the Australian legislature or in the trust statutes. 
2.5  Failure to Inquire ― Financial Advice ― Looking the Other Way 
Opes Prime131 and a related entity, Leveraged Capital Pty Ltd, entered into Securities Lending 
Agreements (SLAs) with their respective clients.132 This was one of many cases involving conduct 
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by so-called margin lenders where title to the underlying assets passed to the funding banks, often 
without the knowledge of the investors, many of whom were longstanding clients.133 Imobilari Pty 
Ltd v Opes Prime134 sought to make ‘the banks legally liable for the allegedly misleading conduct 
engaged in by Opes in connection with share lending transactions entered into with investors’.135 
Banks being knowingly concerned that Opes made misleading representation to investors that they 
retained the beneficial interests in the loaned shares could result in equitable136 and statutory 
liability.137 However, the ‘elements of an express trust (intent, object of the trust, and beneficiary) 
were absent’.138 
Knowledge, being heavily nuanced and ‘not explicitly settled by the High Court’,139 is 
nonetheless to be applied in this case as ‘knowledge of facts that would put an honest and 
reasonable person on notice (but not merely inquiry) of a real and not remote risk that the 
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133 Primebroker Securities Limited v Christopher John Scott [2015] VSC No S CI 2013 4962; SC Capital Pty 
Ltd v Primebroker Securities Limited (in liquidation) (receivers and managers appointed) SCV [2008] 
SCV 10548 (Efthim AJ). 
134 Imobilari Pty Ltd v Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd [2008] FCA 1920 (Finkelstein J). 
135 Ibid [1]. 
136 Barnes v Addy (1874) 9 Ch App 244. 
137 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 52, 75B; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 79, 1041H; Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12DA. As Finkelstein J noted in Imobilari Pty 
Ltd v Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd [2008] FCA 1920 [19], ‘Opes misled it [the client] into believing 
that it was opening a margin lending account (ie entering into share mortgage transactions where it 
retained beneficial ownership) rather than securities lending accounts (ie entering into straight sales 
where it gave up all ownership interests) and the bank both knew (or ought to have known) that it was 
being misled and actively went along with it’. 
138 Imobilari Pty Ltd v Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd [2008] FCA 1920 [25] (Finkelstein J). 
139 Ibid [27]. 
 




transfer was in breach of trust or fiduciary duty or involved the misapplication of trust property’ 
…140 However, what that formulation means is debatable.141  
In this, and other similar cases, there were regular commercial interactions between the funding 
banks (wholesalers) and the intermediaries, like Opes, which were the packagers or retailers of 
these financial products. Formulated legally,  
at best, the allegations would establish that the banks had knowledge of circumstances that 
would have put an honest and diligent person on inquiry. Or, to put it another way, the banks 
were negligent in failing to keep aware of what Opes was up to …142 It is not an overly 
speculative leap from the proposition that the banks ‘should have made due diligence inquiries’ 
to the conclusion that, perhaps, the banks did make such inquiries from which they would have 
found out through readily available materials … what Opes was representing to investors …143 
The rejection of a duty of inquiry is effectively the rejection of a negligence standard …144  
It should be expected that a diligent bank officer, and their risk committees, based on freely 
available public information and regular commercial interaction, would have known about the 
ultimate destination of their funds and the terms on which they were being deployed. A diligent 
financial institution should have studied the AMSLA, being very complicated commercial 
documents. Looking the other way should not excuse liability. Neither should overt conflicts of 
interest between NBFE director obligations to their clients and contractual obligations to the banks. 
2.6  Disclosure ― An International Problem 
Market based regulatory systems rely heavily on disclosure, including disclosure of conflicts of 
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interest. ‘Such disclosure is worse than useless if it is not comprehensive’.145 ‘The belief that the 
best approach to information asymmetry is the provision of additional data … [is] acceptable if 
accompanied by full, even if largely incomprehensible, disclosure’,146 leads to documentation 
complexities under the acceptable guise of transparency which hide the narrative required to make 
sound investment decisions.  
Disclosure documents often follow legal form rather than economic substance focussed on 
the sustainability of business models. This has been a particular problem in non-prudentially 
regulated Managed Investment Schemes (MIS) in Australia and the UK which do not have US style 
Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) sections in their offer documents which must be in 
plain English.  
‘Does suitable documentation exist at all’?147 Disclosure has become an end in itself, 
reflecting regulation of market behaviour through process rather than the primacy of the investor or 
beneficiary reliant upon trusted financial intermediaries. Regulation is seen ‘through the eyes of the 
industry rather than its customers’148 with penalties for ‘market abuse rather than customer 
abuse’.149 Disclosure is at best an imperfect tool in a financial consumer market where conflicts of 
interest are permitted. What financial consumers need is trust generated by long term ‘deeper’150 
relationships. This is the European fiduciary-like duty of care tradition, albeit subverted (as in the 
UK) in recent decades by the advent of product selling and transactional relationships.  
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2.7  Information Asymmetry: Is a Governance Regime based on Disclosure Sufficient 
Investor Protection? 
Multilayered MIS structures can be complex for all but the most sophisticated and attentive retail 
investor to understand.151 It is ‘not uncommon that a MIS invests in another MIS to gain exposure 
to underlying assets in a cost effective manner (eg a retail feeder fund investing in wholesale funds 
that have greater economies of scale. It is therefore not unsuitable for retail investors’.152 Lack of 
product understanding also extends to financial advisers, wealth managers, directors of MIS and 
trustees of APRA regulated superannuation entities and self-managed superannuation fund trustees. 
In the US, lack of financial product knowledge by the fund manager has required regulatory 
intervention.  
One of the problems in disclosure is how to report underlying assets in multilayered 
structures, especially in foreign jurisdictions, where a custodian holds the assets and where there is 
constant asset turnover. The ASIC Act and the Corporations Act previously imposed restrictions on 
the investment strategy of registered MIS. These restrictions were removed to allow diversification 
provided that the investments were not made for the purposes of avoiding regulation. The removal 
of this restriction facilitated fraudulent behaviour in two Trio MIS in 2009.153 
Australia is not unique in suffering from systemic creeping corruption arising from 
disclosure limitations. In Australia, how is complete disclosure of economic rather than 
transactional interest to be enforced where there is no legal obligation to do so? Where there is no 
interest in it by the parties concerned? ‘It is necessary to shift legislator’s attention from ex post 
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enforcement to ex ante supervised self-regulatory regime’.154 Proactive disclosure (including 
potential conflicts of interest) should apply to all in the investment chain.  
2.8  Disclosure in Comparative Jurisdictions 
In Germany, retail investors are treated as financial consumers rather than capital providers. 
Disclosure must be in a ‘comprehensible form’.155 It is not information that is being consumed, but 
confidence in the person providing the disclosures.156 This policy widens disclosure obligations to 
investors enlivening its culpa in contrahendo doctrine with statutory ‘very detailed level of 
codification’.157 Law reform designed to unlock retail investor savings, relying on their financial 
literacy (but without formal investor education) and on advice, also required liberalisation of 
financial products ‘easily understood by the “average retail investor”’…158 German law differs 
substantively from Australian law in these respects.  
2.9  Related Party Transactions, Conflicts of Interest and Duty 
Related parties, conflicts of interest and duty are common in MIS. The empirical analysis suggests 
that related party transactions have predictive veracity to conflicts of interest, failures in disclosure, 
dishonesty and breaches of statutory and fiduciary duties.  
                                                 
154 Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Hidden Ownership in Europe: BAFin’s Decision in Schaeffler v Continental’ (2009) 10 
European Business Organization Review 115, 146. 
155 Niamh Moloney, ‘Building a Retail Investment Culture through Law: The 2004 Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive’ (2005) 6 European Business Organization Law Review 341, 386. 
156 Susanne Kalss, ‘Civil Law Protection of Investors in Austria – A Situation Report from Amidst a Wave of 
Investor Law Suits’ (2012) 13 European Business Organization Law Review 211, 225. 
157 Sebastian Barry and Hannes Bracht, ‘The Implementation of the MiFID into the WpHG’ (2008) 9(9) 
German Law Journal 1177, 1185. 
158 Moloney, ‘Building a Retail Investment Culture through Law’ (n 155) 352. 
 




Recusal from a meeting is common practice in Australia where there are related parties and 
conflicts of interest. Jones v Invion159 makes a mockery of such practices. Recusal and mere 
disclosure are not sufficient.160 ‘[C]ould hardly be considered arms-length … It rather suggests the 
contrary, that it was a collegial or corporate or complicit endeavour’.161  
The directors acting ‘in concert’162 did not confine themselves to improper board 
procedures, but were also aware of shareholder disquiet about corporate governance and their likely 
rejection of approval for remuneration in the form of performance rights. For these directors, a 
corporate governance standard which relied upon unminuted oral agreement several years 
previously whereby ‘any of them, acting alone, could exercise the authority of the Board’163 was 
sufficient. There could be ‘no suggestion that the non-executive directors were fully informed’.164 
In fact, they were incorrectly informed. 
Dishonest behaviour may in some circumstances have an honest explanation. Relief from 
liability requires a positive finding of honesty, not available to these Invion directors. These 
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directors ‘owed fiduciary duties to the company of which they were directors, to avoid conflict of 
duty and interest and not to take advantage of their position to secure a personal benefit.165 They did 
not exercise reasonable care and diligence,166 or act in good faith,167 and used their ‘position to gain 
personal advantage’.168 
In Trilogy v Sullivan:169 
This is a tale of a rapacious Gold Coast property developer with grandiose plans, a compliant 
and obliging valuer who lacked independence, and a responsible entity of a managed investment 
scheme the officers of which appeared unable or unwilling to say ‘no’ to the developer, or to 
exercise appropriate care and diligence… [T]he scheme and its members were left significantly 
out of pocket.170 
Some directors ‘well knew that the proposal was not supported by any remotely acceptable “as is” 
valuation…’171 
Another Gold Coast related party case, Managed Investments:172 
The insouciant attitude of the defendants to this misuse of money intended to be used for PIF’s 
investors beggars belief.173 [T]hose controlling responsible entities … must act with honesty and 
competence and remember at all times that they are dealing with other people’s money.174 
In a consolidating NBFE market with a limited supply of knowledgeable directors, trustees, and 
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171 Ibid [612]. 
172 ASIC v Managed Investments Ltd (No 10) [2017] QSC 96 (Douglas J). 
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professional advisers, it is inevitable that their fiduciary duties be compromised by conflicts of 
interest, actual or potential.175 Commercial practice has been to establish Chinese Walls. If they 
serve a useful or proper purpose, their scope is necessarily limited by the permeable nature of walls, 
originally designed to quarantine information from persons within one organisation. Where the 
proper exercise of fiduciary duty extends to decisions about fellow directors and trustees, including 
litigation, Chinese Walls are unlikely to suffice.176 
In Australia, many public offer superannuation entities (industry funds) have representative 
directors from employers and employees. Originally with equal representation,177 now subject to 
contested legislative change, these appointments do lead to conflicts of interest. There are no 
differences in the SIS Act in relation to responsibilities as directors of the trustee notwithstanding 
differences in the manner of the appointments.178 This conflict appears to be an integral part of the 
SIS legislation.  
The potential for conflict by virtue of their appointment alone does not mean that there is a 
conflict of the sort that means a director is in breach of a fiduciary duty. There must be 
something more that shows that there is in fact a conflict of duty between the interests of the 
directors of a trustee of a fund. This must be determined by reference to the circumstances and 
not by references to a formula or recitation of principle.179 
                                                 
175 Nuncio D’Angelo, ‘Private equity investing by financial institutions: Navigating hidden reefs in 
treacherous waters’ (2003) 31 Australian Business Law Review 325. 
176 Australian Executor Trustees Ltd v Provident Capital Ltd, in the matter of Provident Capital Ltd 
(receivers and managers appointed) (in liq) [2013] FCA 1461 (Rares J). 
177 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 89. 
178 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 10(1). 
179 VBN and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2006] AATA 710 [547] (S A Forgie V-P and B H 
Pascoe). 
 




Conflicts of interest may be ameliorated,180 but only in circumstances specifically to the 
appointment as representative director.181 Naively, ‘[a] further safeguard to the protection of 
member’s interests is to rely on a well-informed membership with the right to participate in 
managing the affairs of their fund’.182 
The influence of Registered Organisations in the investment economy is driven by 
compulsory superannuation outsourced to the private sector. It is a recent phenomenon, its 
significance under-appreciated. This significance has not attracted the regulatory attention it 
deserves: until Heydon:183 
the existing criminal laws do not appear to operate as much of a deterrent to employers giving 
and union officials taking bribes, secret commissions and other lawful payments … History 
appears to be repeating itself …184 It is a recurring problem…. it is insidious. It is immensely 
damaging … longstanding … clandestine …185  
Heydon identified unhealthy culture facilitating corrupting benefits of various forms as related party 
transactions as cultural problems ‘antithetical to the rule of law ... if unchecked, the culture comes 
to taint and impact the wider society’.186 There are ‘significant issues about the scope and 
effectiveness of existing law concerning the duties of union officers … existing law appears to have 
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done nothing to prevent the apparent egregious misappropriations of … assets’.187 Utterly derisory 
… manifestly inadequate…’188 Systemic failure of regulation to prevent improper conduct by 
officers of registered organisations: members of the public and the organisations concerned surely 
would agree ― how can this be?  
Recent examples of financial misconduct within registered organisations have demonstrated that 
the existing regulatory framework is not sufficient to provide members of registered 
organisations with confidence that the management of registered organisations is accountable 
and transparent and that their membership contributions are being used for proper purposes.189  
‘Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants …’190 
  
                                                 
187 Ibid ch 3 2. 
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3.  The Empirical Evidence, Cause and Effect 1981-2018 
Systemic Failures in Law and their Empirical Effects 
Many reform areas have lagged for … a lack of a specific enough analytical framework and 
appropriate data with which to evaluate the possible costs and benefits of various regulations 
and their interactions, making reform steps consequently unclear; and a lack of practical 
methods of implementation…191  
This research provides that analytical framework. It converts unstructured text to a quantitative data 
set on which future policy can be based. It provides insightful data in several dimensions which are 
indicators and tools to predict ex ante investment legal risk, hitherto ex post. This framework 
identifies previously unknown factors and the basis for strategic and tactical reform. 
3.1  Non-Bank Financial Entities (NBFEs) 
This empirical analysis quantifies the financial losses incurred by investors in the Australian NBFE 
sector through the period described in Chapter 2. Loss is defined as complete or partial loss of 
funds, impairment, or risk of complete or partial loss. Dates of these failures are estimated from the 
date of administrator or provisional liquidator appointments or the date of the first court judgment 
(including directions hearings). Malfeasance may have commenced at earlier dates but remained 
undiscovered or unreported. The sample includes failed NBFEs from 1981 to 2018, but excludes 
those frozen as a result of the GFC in 2008/9 and subsequently unfrozen.  
The categories of NBFE in the sample include: financial products and financial services 
conglomerates; investment banks, government rescued entities; insurance entities; hedge funds; 
Managed Investment Schemes (MIS) and debenture trusts (real estate); MIS (forestry and 
agribusiness); companies with similar agribusiness models to MIS; MIS (infrastructure); securities 
brokers and securities leveraged lending; securities trading platforms; wealth, financial planning 
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and funds management firms and workers entitlement funds (being exempt MIS). NBFEs in the 
Australian superannuation industry include industry funds, retail funds, corporate funds, and 
SMSFs. There is a small (by number) government superannuation sector.192 
3.2  Methodology 
‘[I]n Australia, comprehensive case data regarding filed cases or settled cases are not available’.193 
A review of published senior court judgments194 of NBFE cases (n=320, of which 199 have 
authoritative primary empirical data) 1981-2018 (a 38 year investment period) forms the basis of 
this analysis. Many cases involved multiple proceedings. There is no comprehensive electronic 
search system which captures the reasons for these senior court judgments and reliance on case 
catchwords can be misleading. A reading of the judgments is required. These hand-collected data 
from the content of the judgments are supplemented by data sourced from other authoritative 
sources including Royal Commissions, Parliamentary Inquiries, ASIC and APRA documents, 
liquidators’ reports, and selected third party publications. Magistrates, District and County Court 
judgments are mostly excluded from the sample. Many of these are professionally unreported. The 
sample excludes unreported private ex-curial proceedings but does include cases where enforceable 
undertakings are an outcome of civil proceedings. Cases are grouped where related parties appear in 
similar judgments, but separated where a related party entity is involved in proceedings involving 
different issues of law or a different business type. For instance, a RE of one or more operational 
MIS may have a related party finance company. These are treated as separate cases, but multiple 
MIS with the same RE are treated as one case. This typology does not diminish the reporting of 
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issues of law in Table 3.22. It does reduce the number of discrete incidences (there are many cases 
with similar multiple incidences in the same case), but does not reduce the number of investors or 
the quantum of their losses. 
There is a lack of consistency in court judgments in the reporting of empirical data. 
Inference is required in some cases. Where there is no reliable primary source, no assumptions have 
been made. Financial press reports are not sources. So it is likely that the data reported below are 
underestimates of the true position. Nonetheless, empirical and legal trends are clear. Care has been 
taken to avoid double counting of empirical data, for instance where a replacement RE becomes 
trustee for a MIS. The analysis identifies the primary legal issues addressed in the judgments, their 
legal effect, estimated number of investors and quantum of their losses and impairment, 
remediation, entities associated with each case, the responsible regulator, date of first reporting, and 
their legal citation. This data is summarised below. There is no other single holistic authoritative 
source. The primary data is in spreadsheet format. Much of the remedial data is publicly unreported, 
some is confidential. What is reported illustrates a low rate of recovery.195 This is supported by this 
analysis with an average 4.24 % recovery or remediation across the sample. There are some 
exceptions where recovery is significantly higher: these merely serve to emphasise the abysmal 
rates of recovery elsewhere, demonstrating that Australia’s ex post regulatory posture does not 
serve investors well. 
3.3  Summary of Empirical Data 
The following tables summarise the empirical data by type of NBFE with Tables 3.17 and 3.21 
reporting the aggregate data. The tables include the number of NBFEs in the sample, the number for 
which there is authoritative source data, investor funds lost or at risk of permanent impairment, and 
the number of investors or beneficiaries adversely impacted. In some cases, for example Table 3.2, 
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government is the sole shareholder notwithstanding that prior to government control, many 
thousands of investors have been involved. In some superannuation entities (Table 3.13) a 
consortium is reported by its membership numbers, not by the number of investor beneficiaries in 
the consortium funds membership. 
TABLE 3.1 Financial Services and Financial Products Conglomerates 
This sample includes vertically integrated multifunction NBFEs. 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
16 15 14,731 112,634 
TABLE 3.2 Government Rescued Financial Entities 
During the sample period, government intervention has resulted in control. 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
5 5 6,502 7 
TABLE 3.3 Insurance Entities 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
14 6 957 69,292 
TABLE 3.4 Hedge Funds 
Hedge funds are pools of capital, historically lightly regulated, mobile capital. Large quantities of 
hedge fund capital can rapidly be brought to bear opaquely on specific investment strategies 
globally. The owners of the capital, the investors, are typically the family offices of high net worth 
individuals, family trusts, and investment banks. Over time, they were joined by superannuation 




funds, retail investors, local government, and university endowment funds.  
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
4 3 738 1,745 
TABLE 3.5 Managed Investment and Debenture Schemes: Real Estate 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
81 56 10,423 291,517 
TABLE 3.6 Managed Investment Schemes: Forestry and Agribusiness 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
33 23 6,826 169,590 
TABLE 3.7 Investment Companies with Similar Business Models 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
6 6 178 2,324 
TABLE 3.8 Managed Investment Schemes: Infrastructure 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
6 2 2,924 850 
 
  




TABLE 3.9 Securities Broking and Leveraged Lending 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
9 8 1,105 2,304 
TABLE 3.10 Securities Trading Platforms 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
18 12 226 5,647 
TABLE 3.11 Wealth Management, Financial Planning, and Funds Management 
This sector is pervasive, often under-skilled, sometimes conflicted, and has seriously impacted the 
financial standing of many of its clients. 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
72 43 4,018 423,741 
TABLE 3.12 Retail Superannuation Funds 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
3 3 372.50 31,076 
TABLE 3.13 Industry Superannuation Funds 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
19 5 2,918 291,458 




TABLE 3.14 Workers Entitlement Funds (WEFs) 
WEFs are controlled by related party registered organisations, usually structured as exempt MIS. 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
7 2 146 24,730 
TABLE 3.15 Other Superannuation Entities 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
8 3 105 1,370 
TABLE 3.16 Finance Companies 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
16 7 81 487,323 
Other Entities 
Other NBFEs not part of the sample include film schemes, property timeshare schemes, actively 
managed strata title schemes, contributory mortgage schemes, litigation funders, betting schemes, 
aged care and retirement accommodation, and management rights.196 
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TABLE 3.17 Aggregate Data 
No. NBFEs in sample  No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
320 199 52,251 1,915,608 
3.4  Table of Cases  
This data has been sourced from 199 senior court cases.197 
3.5  A National Productivity Issue: the Law Matters 
NBFE investment is largely at the margin, being venture financing not provided by mainstream 
prudentially regulated banks. Whilst superannuation investment is prudentially regulated, interest 
group pressure is publicly applied to trustees to deploy capital in favoured ways, sometimes by 
related parties. Financing at the margin should earn a risk adjusted return. A proxy for the return 
expected is the ASX long term all accumulation index (ie dividends are reinvested). This is the risk 
adjusted return NBFE investors should have expected if capital had been successfully deployed in 
accordance with disclosure documents. That capital has not been successfully deployed in the cases 
cited. Much has been lost in deadweight costs (on investment and insolvency), with the balance lost, 
earning zero or considerably less than forecast. These are direct losses only. They do not account 
for indirect, consequential, and social losses or the increased risk aversion of other investors. Table 
3.18 quantifies the adverse economic impact. This data is illustrative ― it is not definitive of the 
complete universe of NBFEs. It relies on extraction of empirical data from the unstructured data 
sets in the sample. Hitherto, comparative conclusions have been largely anecdotal and ad hoc. Table 
3.18 attempts to begin to quantify the social and economic costs of present Australian law. 
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TABLE 3.18 Estimated Impact of Cumulative Investor Losses on Australian Productivity198 
 
The aggregate adverse consequences are equivalent to over 0.46% of 2016–17 nominal Australian 
GDP. This capital should have been generating economic activity each and every year since 
investment up to the date of capital return and subsequent reinvestment. Had the capital been 
properly deployed in accordance with disclosure documents, it implies that the national economy 
could have grown 23.14% faster than it did, driven by entrepreneurial NBFE financing. The 
essential insight is that the cumulative misallocation of capital in aggregate ― the opportunity cost 
― causes lower economic growth. This is particularly so because NBFE financing is at the margin 
― it finances projects that would not otherwise occur. 
This has considerable economic costs for Australian business. It is a national productivity 
issue and is a direct result of systemic failures in the Australian regulatory regime. Risk aversion 
and reluctance to invest in NBFEs is a feature of the present investment landscape. Paucity of 
marginal sources of capital for ventures leads directly to capital constraints in the more 
entrepreneurial parts of the economy. It explains the paucity of available collective investment 
options, the distrust of mandatory superannuation and the preference for direct investment into real 
property, particularly by Self-Managed Superannuation Funds (SMSFs) and discretionary trusts. 
Most investors are in the 25–64 age cohorts (being a 40 year investment period). Losses thus 
fall disproportionately on them. A large proportion of that potential cohort is limited to direct 
investment in compulsory non-SMSF superannuation, home mortgage, rental mortgages, and bank 
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GDP computation AUD billion
Accumulated investor losses 52,251                  
All Ords All Accum Index LT return 15% 7,838                    
Nominal Australian GDP 2016–17 1,693,452             
Loss % nominal GDP 0.4628%
Nominal Australian GDP growth 2016–17 2.00%
Loss % nominal GDP growth 23.14%




deposits. By inference, the investing cohort is smaller than the aggregate suggests. The percentage 
of investors affected in aggregate sets the lower bound which assumes 100% of the aggregate 
NBFE investing cohort actually invests. Hence the proportion suffering adverse impacts is likely to 
be significantly larger than 15.87%.  
Much NBFE investing is through discretionary (family) and SMSF trusts, a lower 
proportion of investors than the aggregate cohort. Many of these operate through custodians or 
nominees. Many will have multiple investments, multiple investment structures, and will have been 
exposed in more than one instance. That is why the data is illustrative, not definitive. A definitive 
empirical data set demands transparency in beneficial ownership. This does not presently exist and 
cannot necessarily be extracted from the judgments. It also demands analytical resources which 
only the largest custodians or ASIC and APRA could have. Indeed, it may be beyond human 
intervention and, should transparency occur, require the use of cognitive, artificially intelligent 
digital robots to source, analyse, and report on the data. This data uses the number of SMSFs and 
Australian resident trusts as a proxy ― it seeks to do nothing more than provide a basis for 
assessing the macroeconomic and social impacts. The essential insight is it provides a 
methodological framework for when transparency of diffuse securities ownership and the 
application of artificial intelligence in the law allow. 




TABLE 3.19 Percentage of Investing Population Directly Affected199 
 
If individual discretionary and SMSF trust investors are used as a proxy, the proportion directly 
affected rises to 107.54%. So the range is 15.87% – 107.54%. Some investors use multiple 
structures and some invest personally outside of these structures which accounts for the statistical 
oddity in the upper bound data. The percentage accorded these investing structures is a proxy for 
the upper bound. 
Reduced propensity for NBFE investment by those not suffering direct losses would further 
increase this proportion. This implies considerable disruption of the NBFE capital markets. The 
costs of disruption have been quantified elsewhere with estimates of economic loss having a 
multiplier of 18 times, much of it attributed to ‘unmanaged conflicts of interest’.200 
                                                 
199 Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook (CIA, 2015) 
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Investing population analysis
Individuals male female
25–54 4,783,473             4,626,603       
55–64 1,321,246             1,341,329       
6,104,719             5,967,932       
Total possible investing population 12,072,651           
# Investors lost capital 1,915,608             
% of total possible investing population 15.87%
Corporate investors
# SMSF's 596,517                
# SMSF members 1,130,000             
# Discretionary trusts 642,000                
Total corporate investing structures 1,238,517             
Total estimated members 1,772,000             
# Investors lost capital 1,905,608             
% of total possible investing population 107.54%




3.6  Hypothesis Testing by Qualitative Research 
Confidential qualitative research interviews have been conducted with senior professional and 
investment persons (n=28) in each of Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane. Each person was 
questioned using open ended technique from a prepared list designed to identify problematic issues 
requiring reform. Table 3.20 summarises the results of those interviews. Responses fell into 51 
categories with significant geographic variances. Top quartile data are the averages across the three 
cities. Of the 43 proposed reform options proffered, only one had significant support (50%), being 
the imposition of inalienable fiduciary duty in the investment chain, support being greatest from 
Sydney respondents (70.59%). This result is significant given Sydney’s prominence in Australian 
funds management. Melbourne respondents (n=5) had unanimous criticism of the prevalence of 
related party transactions. Their responses appear to be influenced by their proximity to the industry 
superfund sector, of which there was excoriating criticism. However, it is small sample size, but 
supports analysis reported in Heydon. 




TABLE 3.20 Qualitative Research Results from Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane 
 
3.8  Systemic Causes of Failure Identified in the Empirical Legal Analysis 
3.8.1  Methodology 
The senior court judgments have been analysed using the terminology in the judgments. That 
terminology is not always consistent. This analysis is summarised in Table 3.22 ‘Issues of Law’, 
ranked by absolute incidence of the issue and expressed as a percentage of the total incidences in 
the sample (917 incidences) from 320 cases. Many cases involve multiple breaches of multiple 
statutes. The primary Corporations Act provisions are cited indicatively to clarify the descriptors, 
but there are often multiple breaches of that statute. Other oft quoted statutes include the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission Act, Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act, Australian 
Competition and Consumer Act (formerly Trade Practices Act), and National Consumer Credit 
Protection Act.  
Top Quartile % Sample
Related party transactions 60.71%
Financial regulation in isolation: accretive tinkering: need trust principles 57.14%
Intrusion of 'black' letter law 50.00%
Conflicts of interest - related trustees & investment managers/promoters/advisers 50.00%
Box ticking regulation by ASIC 46.43%
Financial planning not a profession 46.43%
Appearances of probity only: self interest rules 39.29%
Australian financial sector not internationally competitive in structure or fees 35.71%
Ineffective leadership at ASIC/ wrong leadership motivations 35.71%
Smart lawyer manipulation of complex 'black letter' law 32.14%
Financial planners should have unqualified best interest duty to client 32.14%
Boards need more independent minds 32.14%
Adviser financial literacy often flawed 32.14%
Most favoured reform options
All to be subject to fiduciary principles 50.00%




TABLE 3.21 Summary by Category, Funds Lost/Impaired and Investors Impacted 
 
Commercial issues including mismatch of assets and liabilities and leverage (common in MIS) are 
not included in the analysis but are additional non-legal causes of NBFE failure. In many cases, 
particularly in real estate MIS, financial planning, superannuation and finance companies, large 
numbers of investors are impacted as a result of one incidence. There are comparatively few 
discrete incidences in financial literacy. This does not mean an absence of systemic failure. On the 
contrary, Table 3.22 demonstrates otherwise: it is a function of the number of discrete incidences 
reported by typology in the judgment which determines their empirical impact. Financial literacy 
cases include those involving informed consent and contributory negligence. Arguably, the 
prevalence of lawlessness in unlawful unregistered MIS, egregious behaviour in registered MIS, 
and unlicensed financial services businesses is a financial literacy category since the investing 
community should be knowledgeable enough to identify and avoid such cases. That is not so and 
the data has not been treated so in this analysis.  
Similarly, where one entity the subject of judicial review operates multiple investment 
schemes (often a large number of registered and unregistered schemes), this is reported as one 
incidence of the issues in that judgment. Cases involving the antecedents of the Corporations Act 
(Corporations Law, State Companies Codes), and ASIC (State Corporate Affairs Commissions and 
NBFE category # NBFE's with Funds lost/permanently impaired # beneficiaries/investors impacted
authoritative empirical data AUD million
Financial conglomerates 15 14,731 112,634
Government rescued entities 5 6,502 7
Insurance entities 6 957 69,292
Hedge funds 3 738 1,745
MIS/debenture schemes real estate 56 10,423 291,517
MIS forestry & agribusiness 23 6,826 169,590
Companies similar business model 6 178 2,324
MIS infrastructure 2 2,924 850
Securities broking & leveraged lending 8 1,105 2,304
Securities trading platforms 12 226 5,647
Wealth management/financial planning 43 4,018 423,741
Retail superannuation 3 372 31,076
Industry superannuation 5 2,918 291,458
Workers entitlement funds 2 146 24,730
Other superannuation entities 3 105 1,370
Finance companies 7 81 487,323
TOTAL SAMPLE 199 52,251                                           1,915,608                                       




Australian Securities Commission) are included in the equivalent modern Corporations Act 
provision. Incidence of breaches of fiduciary duty are likely to be understated because many of the 
entities are not regarded as fiduciaries in Australian law and, if they are, have the legal ability to 
contract out of that relationship. 




TABLE 3.22 Legal Matters Raised in the Judgments 
 
Legal matters raised in the judgments # by incidence % cases
Related party transactions CA s 191 76 23.97%
Misleading & deceptive/unconscionable conduct CA s 1041H, AA s 12DA, ACCA s 52 71 22.40%
Fraud 53 16.72%
Breach of fiduciary duties (statute & general law) CA s 601FD 51 16.09%
Financial services business CA s 911A/ financial advice CA s 781/ dealing CA s 780 without AFSL 47 14.83%
Breach of good faith, proper purpose, best interest duty CA ss 181-184, 961 (FoFA) 45 14.20%
Conflicts of interest & duty CA s 191 45 14.20%
Unregistered unlawful MIS CA s 601ED 43 13.56%
Insolvency of NBFE (Incl RE/trustee) 33 10.41%
Judicial/Court directions 32 10.09%
Failure to properly disclose material matters CA s 191 32 10.09%
Untrue/defective/misleading prospectus/PDS disclosure CA s 728 26 8.20%
Improper financial advice 24 7.57%
Uncommercial/unconscionable transactions 23 7.26%
Breach of trustee &/or RE duties (uncategorised) 22 6.94%
Corporate governance failures/director competence/fit & proper 19 5.99%
Dishonesty/lack of integrity CA s 601FC,FD 18 5.68%
Knowing assistance, receipt, accessorial liability, Barnes v Addy 17 5.36%
Breach of care & diligence duty CA s 180 15 4.73%
Reckless conduct 14 4.42%
No lawful offer document CA s 1012,1013 14 4.42%
Improper/ misleading accounting treatments 13 4.10%
Ponzi scheme CA s 461 13 4.10%
Negligence 12 3.79%
Failure to properly keep books and records 12 3.79%
Breach of auditor duty 11 3.47%
Falsification of documents 11 3.47%
Inability to provide informed consent 11 3.47%
Public interest 10 3.15%
Spurious valuations/no valuations 9 2.84%
Continuous disclosure obligations/ ASX listing rules 9 2.84%
Trust Acts  (NSW, Qld, WA) ss 22, 59-63, 96 8 2.52%
Breach of sole purpose test (superannuation) SIS Act s 62 7 2.21%
Jurisdiction 7 2.21%
Restraint on travel/passport forfeiture CA s 1323 6 1.89%
Rescission/ ab initio 6 1.89%
Lack of fully informed consent 5 1.58%
Constructive trust 5 1.58%
Insider trading, market rigging,  CA s 1043A 5 1.58%
Privilege 4 1.26%
Tortious liability 3 0.95%
Briginshaw standard 3 0.95%
No replacement RE/trustee 3 0.95%
Court appointed investment manager 2 0.63%
Calderbank offers 2 0.63%
Improper custody of assets 2 0.63%
Costs reasonable 2 0.63%
Dividends out of capital 2 0.63%
CA ss 601NF, 1325, 2 0.63%
Inaccurate forecasting disclosure 2 0.63%
Breach of CA s 177 1 0.32%
Breach of CA s 283DA 1 0.32%
Breach of enforceable undertaking 1 0.32%
Unauthorised reduction of capital 1 0.32%
Chose in action 1 0.32%
CA s 674 1 0.32%
Inducement 1 0.32%
CA ss 249D, 249N 1 0.32%
Self dealing 1 0.32%
Related party power of attorney 1 0.32%
Total incidences in 320 cases 917




3.8.2 Interpretation of Data 
This data has then been ranked as top decile and top quartile prevalence of the legal issues 
identified in the judgments. These are the top 10% and 25% issues of law identified in the 
judgments. For example, related party transactions recur in 22.16% of the top 10% of issues of law 
addressed in the judgments.  
TABLE 3.23 Prevalence of Issues of Law as Top Decile and Top Quartiles of Sample 
 
The primary issues of law have then been grouped into legal causes of systemic failure. Some of 
these groupings include multiple issues of law, others which are discretely identified are reported as 
in Table 3.22. For example, dishonesty includes direct judicial references to dishonest conduct, but 
also includes judicial references to spurious valuations, lack of integrity, falsification of documents, 
fraud, self-dealing, Ponzi schemes, inducement, insider trading, and knowing assistance. Fiduciary 
duties includes instances of improper use of trust assets, breaches of State Trust Acts, auditor duty, 
and constructive trust. 
Issues of law Top decile prevalence Top quartile prevalence
n =343 incidences n = 623 incidencies
Related party transactions CA s 191 22.16% 12.20%
Misleading & deceptive/unconscionable conduct CA s 1041H, AA s 12DA, ACCA s 52 20.70% 11.40%
Fraud 15.45% 8.51%
Breach of fiduciary duties (statute & general law) CA s 601FD 14.87% 8.19%
Financial services business CA s 911A/ financial advice CA s 781/ dealing CA s 780 without AFSL 13.70% 7.54%
Breach of good faith, proper purpose, best interest duty CA ss 181-184, 961 (FoFA) 13.12% 7.22%
Conflicts of interest & duty CA s 191 13.12% 7.22%
Unregistered unlawful MIS CA s 601ED 6.90%
Insolvency of NBFE (Incl RE/trustee) 5.30%
Judicial/Court directions 5.14%
Failure to properly disclose material matters CA s 191 5.14%
Untrue/defective/misleading prospectus/PDS disclosure CA s 728 4.17%
Improper financial advice 3.85%
Uncommercial/unconscionable transactions 3.69%
Breach of trustee &/or RE duties (uncategorised) 3.53%




TABLE 3.24 Incidence of Systemic Failures in the Australian Regulatory System 
 
3.9 Predictive Veracity of the Empirical Data 
There are predictive insights to be derived from the top decile, top quartile, and systemic failures 
tables. Table 3.25 is a correlation analysis where the correlated incidence is greater or equal to 90% 
of the principal variable identified in top decile, top quartile and systemic failure tables.201 These 
are not regression analyses with dependent variables. It reports incidences derived from the 
judgments and correlates those incidences against each of the other variables listed. 199 case 
analyses is a statistically substantial sample. Therefore, it a reasonable hypothesis that this empirical 
analysis has predictive veracity, and by inference, to non-curial cases.  
                                                 
201 For full correlation matrices, see Millhouse (n 1) app 2. 
Systemic failures
(by category) # by incidence % incidence
Dishonesty 128 15.98%
Related parties/conflicts of interest CA s 191 122 15.23%
Directors/trustee duties CA ss180-184, SISA s 62 119 15.23%
Disclosure 108 14.86%
Misleading/deceptive/unconscionable conduct CA s 1041H, AA s 12Da, ACCA s 52 94 11.74%
Fiduciary duty (statute & general law) 77 9.61%
Financial advice CA ss 780,781,911; Unlicensed/breaches of AFSL 71 8.86%
Unlawful unregistered MIS CA 601ED 43 5.37%
Governance 22 2.75%
Financial literacy 17 2.12%
Total incidences 801




TABLE 3.25 Correlation Analysis of Principal Variables  
 
The correlation matrices point to substantial systemic risk buried deeply in the governance of 
entities in the financial system. Remedying this risk will require substantive law reform to eliminate 
or ameliorate its causes. A starting point is where matrices identify a 90% greater or equal 
correlation between the selected variables. 
Related party transactions and misleading and deceptive conduct are closely correlated 
(93.42%) ― statistical siblings. There are high correlations between incidences of dishonesty, 
related parties/conflicts of interest (95.31%), breaches of directors’ fiduciary and best interest duties 
(95.31%), and failures in disclosure (92.97%). Where there are related parties, there will be 
conflicts of interest with an absolute correlation with breaches of directors’ duties.  
Directors, regulators and investors should focus their attention on any transaction where 
there are related parties. A review of the complete correlation tables identifies other areas of the law 
requiring reform and its enforcement. This data suggest that present law, or its enforcement, is not 
effective. 
Incidences for which ASIC alone bears market conduct responsibility account for 81.23% of 
the sample. A minority of cases involve superannuation entities. There are relatively few judgments 
in the superannuation sector. Those cited, Commercial Nominees, Trio, Oasis, and some workers 
Legal matters raised in the judgments Variable Recurrence % of sample Correlation
Top decile
Related party transactions CA s 191 1 22.16%
Misleading & deceptive/unconscionable conduct CA s 1041H, AA s 12DA, ACCA s 52 2 20.70% 93.42%
Top quartile
Dishonesty 1 15.98%
Related parties/conflicts of interest CA s 191 2 15.23% 95.31%
Systemic causes - first variable correlation
Dishonesty 1 15.98%
Related parties/conflicts of interest CA s 191 2 15.23% 95.31%
Directors/trustee duties CA ss180-184, SISA s 62 3 15.23% 95.31%
Disclosure 4 14.86% 92.97%
Systemic causes - second variable correlation
Related parties/conflicts of interest CA s 191 2 15.23%
Directors/trustee duties CA ss180–184, SISA s 62 3 15.23% 100.00%




compensation MIS all involve related party transactions and resulted inter alia in fraud, misleading 
and deceptive conduct, asset impairment and direct consequential losses to superannuation and MIS 
beneficiaries.  
If the predictive qualities of this empirical data are correct, then the publicly reported cases 
of related party transactions in industry superannuation entities need to be thoroughly investigated 
by APRA, in Workers Entitlement Funds by ASIC and the ROC. There are many instances of 
related party transactions, conflicts of interest, questionable adherence to the sole purpose test, and 
payments made of questionable veracity. Such egregious behaviour blights the history of Australian 
MIS, as Heydon and Hayne identified, and have recurred in financial conglomerates, whether 
NBFEs or otherwise. 
3.10 Cyclical Patterns of Behaviour 1981-2018 
The evidence suggests that evolution of the regulation and supervision of NBFEs falls into the four 
distinct periods identified in Chapter 2. Many cases have resulted in judicial intervention over many 
years. The dates attributed in Table 3.25 are the first date of intervention by administration or court 
referral, not the subsequent dates of the cases as reported. Table 3.26 illustrates its cyclical nature 
and pinpoints the commencement of each period. New cases also recur within these cycles. The 
peak in 1990 is a direct result of the regulatory environment through the 1980s (Deregulation and 
Entrepreneurship), its weaknesses exposed by the ASX correction of 1987 and the subsequent 
recession in Australia. From 2001 onwards, incidents of litigation increase as a result of a 
developing and more informed investment community and the advent of class actions (Disquiet). 
Some of these are attributable to the introduction of the Managed Investments Act in 1998. It 
significantly changed the nature of Australian collective investment scheme regulation. It facilitated 
the growth of the NBFE sector without providing for proper policy implementation. Regulatory and 
private litigation become prevalent from 2008 onwards as a direct (Reaction) to the manifest 
systemic failures in Australian regulation and supervision. As in 1990, the GFC in 2008/9 exposed 




those underlying failures, and provided cover to those seeking excuses. Subsequent years continue 
judicial intervention as cases are finalised, but do not of themselves provide more than tactical 
responses to specific legal and commercial issues through precedent and statutory accretion. 
Therefore, without substantive law reform, this historical analysis predicts that failures will 
continue to be exposed by a future macroeconomic event. 
  




TABLE 3.26 Cyclical Failure 
 
  










































3.11 Different Peaks: Different Outcomes 
The primary regulators are ASIC, APRA, and the ROC, previously the responsibility of the Fair 
Work Commission. Other regulators include the RBA, the ASX, the ACCC, State and NZ 
authorities. ASIC is involved with 100% of the sample, and of itself directly regulated 81.23% of 
them; ASIC and APRA together (Twin Peaks) regulated 11.08% of the sample. ASIC and the ROC 
regulated a further 2.15% of the sample (Triple Peaks). Despite the constant public criticism of 
ASIC, the data and the cases from which it is derived show ASIC to have been an active regulator. 
It was the plaintiff in 64.32% of the litigated cases.202 This implies that ASIC is not resource 
constrained. The deficiencies in desired outcomes therefore should be attributable to other causes.  
These differences are explained by the different mandates and postures of each regulator. It 
is tempting, but erroneous to infer that ex ante supervision provides a better investor outcome than 
ex post market conduct regulation. ASIC’s responsibility nationwide extends broadly to more than 
2 million entities and much of their commercial activity. ASIC has the broadest mandate of any 
comparable regulator. APRA has a far fewer number of entities to supervise. Nonetheless, 
egregious behaviour has occurred in its supervised entities and within its different statutory 
constructs. 
                                                 
202 Millhouse (n 1) app 3. 




TABLE 3.27 Scope of Regulator Activity in the NBFE Sector 
 
3.12  Is Lawlessness Endemic in Australian Financial Services and Financial Products 
Markets? 
Unlicensed unlawful provision of financial services, financial products, and financial advice and 
unlawful unregistered MIS account for 14.23% of the incidences of systemic failure (Table 3.24) 
and 35.96% of all incidences in the sample (Table 3.22). Some of these incidences relate to the 
same case. These are both top quartile prevalence behaviours over the period of the sample, 
unprevented either by law enforcement or disciplines imposed by the investing public based on 
sound, unconflicted financial advice. Caveat emptor trumps fiduciary principles and statute. To 
illustrate, ‘[t]he schemes are generally designed so that all the investors ever receive are the pieces 
of paper constituting the agreements ... promoters design increasingly more sophisticated schemes 
in attempts to circumvent the laws’.203 
  
                                                 
203 Australian Softwood Forests Pty Ltd v A-G (NSW); Ex Rel Corporate Affairs Commission [1981] HCA 49 
[37] (Murphy J). 
REGULATOR
ASIC/ASC/CAC 264 81.23%













It would have been folly on the part of the legislature to attempt to define or limit what interests 
should be protected or how: to do so would have been to ignore the sad reality that the ingenuity 
of fraudsters [is] inexhaustible, their snares for the gullible pitiless and of infinite variety …204 
Folly indeed. As is the poacher becoming gamekeeper in 1998 subsuming fiduciary law beneath 
well-intended but poorly implemented statute, as the judicial responses analysed in Chapter 4 
illustrate. Warning bells were ignored. 
Malfeasance and egregious behaviour is not restricted to MIS: it occurs in funds controlled 
by registered organisations. ASIC’s good intentions have been subverted by those ignorant of 
fiduciary obligations. Workers Entitlement Funds are MIS, exempted on an annual basis from Part 
5C of the Corporations Act.205 These have been the subject of media disclosure and analysis by 
Heydon. There is a dearth of independent reliable empirical data which could be remedied by the 
Hayne Royal Commission with reform enforced by ASIC and the ROC. 
3.13  The Wallis Legacy: Disclosure, Financial Advice and Financial Literacy 
Implementation failures in these three Wallis principles are directly attributable for 25.84% of the 
incidences of systemic failure (Table 3.24). They are indirectly attributable to another 32.34%, 
being a total of 58.18% of systemic incidences (Table 3.24). This is failure of law on a massive 
scale. This failure continues, with, on average, one new case per week attracting public attention 
                                                 
204 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Bridgecorp Finance Ltd [2006] NSWSC 836 [17] 
(Barrett J) citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mauer-Swiss Securities Ltd 
[2002] NSWSC 684 (Palmer J). 
205 ASIC, ASIC Class Order: Employee Redundancy Funds: relief, CO 02/314 (2014); extended by ASIC 
Instrument: Corporations (Employee Relief) 2015/1150 (December 2015). ASIC has fashioned a new 
legislative instrument [CO 02/314] — ASIC Corporations (Employee Redundancy Funds Relief) 
Instrument 2015/1150 — to extend relief to 1 October 2018. 
 




from February 2018 to February 2019. It fails to recognise that investors are (forcibly) financial 
consumers,206 not suppliers of capital. ‘Products [that] have been designed to be attractive to sell 
rather than meeting the needs of consumers’.207 
It explains community perceptions of ASIC and the frustrations with ASIC uncovered in the 
qualitative research but without their comprehension of ASIC being trapped in an ex post restrictive 
mandate. This empirical data cries out for reform of that mandate. The Managed Investments Act 
facilitated dramatic growth in the availability of collective investment opportunities but deficiencies 
in its implementation have contributed to large investor losses. Disclosure is not sufficient; financial 
advice has been conflicted and deficient, undisciplined by the necessary financial literacy of 
consumers unable to provide informed consent. Reliance on ‘[d]isclosure assumes that the 
capacities of financial consumers and retail investors are universal and rational, when research is 
showing that this is not the case’.208  
  
                                                 
206 Kingsford Smith (n 28) 327–328. 
207 Ben Butler, ‘Can a change of guard fix ASIC’s image?’, The Weekend Australian Business (Sydney), 22–
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4.  The Hayne Legacy of Law and Morality ― A Regulatory Architecture for 21st 
Century Australia 
Empowering the Financial Consumer 
4.1  Themes in Law Reform  
Hayne’s 76 Recommendations of themselves are not enough. Mostly tactical and piecemeal, they 
have attracted criticism and disappointment. To some extent, he was constrained by the Letters 
Patent and time. Critics have largely missed that he also recommends system-wide long term 
reform. It is doctrinal, requiring absolute obedience to the spirit of the law to reflect community 
expectation of fiduciary trust and loyalty. It seeks to remove incentives for malfeasance and 
improve incentives for lifting standards rather than reliance on proscriptive and prescriptive box-
ticking compliance alone. His reform objectives require a framework ―these proposals provide that 
framework.209 
4.2  Investors and Beneficiaries as Financial Consumers 
Future reform strategy should be financial consumer-centric, not supplier or regulator centric. 
Financially independent retirement for Australians is a pipe-dream if that focus is compromised. 
Consumer empowerment through improved financial literacy and destruction of power imbalances 
in the investment chain requires oversight outside of existing regulatory structures. ‘An informed, 
expertly staffed and independent institution evaluating financial regulations and regulatory actions 
from the public’s point of view’.210 This will allow different views to be heard, not subsumed by 
existing vested and politicised interests who will regroup and dilute proposed reforms that affect 
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those interests.211 A specific purpose Reference Group with direct senior ministerial access is 
required. 
Implementation will take ‘significant time for construction, debate, refinement and 
implementation’.212 The qualitative research213 conducted in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane is 
insightful and proposes strategies consistent with jurisdictions that have better dealt with their own 
systemic failures. The top decile sources of failure identified by interviewees are: related party 
transactions, conflicts of interest, accretive statutory tinkering, intrusion of black letter law on trust 
principles, and box-ticking regulation by ASIC. Extended to the top quartile, this list adds: financial 
planning not being a profession, self-interest and lack of probity, ineffective leadership at ASIC, 
Australia’s uncompetitive financial landscape, smart lawyer manipulation of complex black letter 
law, lack of unqualified best interest duty of financial planners, boards needing more independent 
minds, and flawed financial literacy of advisers. 
4.3  Itinera Fiduciae ― Re-Establishment of Trust in the Investment Chain 
‘We are never so vulnerable than when we trust someone’.214 Investment requires trust. Fiduciary 
obligation is the mirror of community expectation of trust in those that advise them or manage their 
funds. ‘Fiduciary law cannot be subsumed under contract … a violation of fiduciary duties carries a 
“moral taint”. … Unlike contract, trust is a moral relationship; its unwarranted violation is a moral 
principle’.215 
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In Australia, there is a trust deficit. ‘Since an underlying motivation of the imposition of 
fiduciary obligations is to maintain public confidence in socially important relationships like that of 
investment, the routine circumvention of such obligations raises public policy concerns’.216  
Fiduciary relationships can and should be found at every point in the investment chain 
where there is discretion, information, reliance or advice. The need is to re-establish foregone trust, 
confidence and respect in fiduciaries required to act as if they should be trusted. This outcome is 
unlikely to be achieved with prescriptive administrative regulation. It is ‘not just a policy choice, 
but an architectural choice about how our law fits together’,217 acknowledged by Hayne. The 
economic interests of investors and beneficiaries supported by holistic fiduciary standards in the 
investment chain is a different proposition from compliance with regulation. In the UK, as in 
Australia, it has led to a different result: creative compliance and creeping corruption. It also leads 
to different approaches to conflicts of interest. Identifying, disclosing and managing conflicts of 
interest in a complex investment chain controlled by multiple intermediaries is incompatible with 
the concept of a fiduciary having stewardship of client property if that fiduciary may have a conflict 
of interest. 
Investor and beneficiary expectations (with statutory support in superannuation best interest 
law) include the optimisation of their value outcomes. What they typically attain, especially in 
Managed Investment Schemes (MIS) are contractual rights or legal interests. The economic 
consequences to the Australian economy are significant. Australia is not unique, but of the 
comparative jurisdictions studied, it has made the least progress addressing systemic problems in 
financial services and financial products regulation. When considering the re-establishment of trust, 
other jurisdictions follow one of two paths: (a) accretive statutory reform, or (b) the application of 
                                                 
216 Tuch (n 13) 478, 516. 
217 Joshua Getzler, ‘“As If” – Accountability and Counterfactual Trust’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law 
Review 973, 988. 




behavioural economics theory to regulation, leading to ex ante industry based regulation 
underpinned by universal fiduciary obligations.  
Presently, Australia, the UK, and the US pursue accretive statutory reform, whilst Canada, 
Germany (with EU overlay), apply different legal mechanisms based on their fiduciary and duty of 
care traditions. These are not without criticism.218 Singapore pursues a culturally nuanced approach 
drawing upon legal tradition but implements German fiduciary-like standards of responsibility. 
The application of behavioural economics research to financial regulation provides the 
theoretical basis for the imposition and extension of fiduciary principles to financial products and 
services. Each country has produced different but insightful results. There is recognition of the 
difference between compliance and values in Australian cases.219  
4.4  The Australian Enigma 
Australian law has uncertain interpretation of the fiduciary status of best interest duties.220 If 
Australian NBFE directors were themselves subject to Untreue221 doctrine (in its proscriptive and 
prescriptive formulations), supreme rather than subordinate, they would be less likely to hide 
                                                 
218 Lisa Zhou, ‘Fiduciary Law, Non-Economic Interests and Amici Curiae’ (2008) 32(3) Melbourne 
University Law Review 1158. 
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reality that the ingenuity of fraudsters inexhaustible, their snares for the gullible pitiless and of infinite 
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behind transactional based disclosure requirements governed by statute and contract. The need to 
apply fiduciary law to investment banks (in their various formulations as financial conglomerates) 
has long been recognised in Australia.222 
The future of trust rests upon fiduciary principles: these need the legal support of contractual 
culpa in contrahendo and Untreue standards. As judicially recently interpreted in Australia, 
fiduciary principles, compromised as they are by statute and contract, have not been sufficient to 
deter malfeasance. Where there have been green shoots of more enlightened interpretation,223 
judicial reticence seeks to limit their broader application. ’[I]t is important [to] preserve fiduciary 
law … at least until a basis for expanding fiduciary law so that it incorporates prescriptive 
obligations is articulated rationally and accepted’.224  
The deterrent effect of fiduciary law will require two components: these are (a) prohibition 
not prioritisation; and (b) prescriptive and positive duties to include financial best interest, meaning 
outcome, improved disclosure and education of the client to at least culpa in contrahendo standard. 
Informed consent should not be ‘a merely formal process’.225 That is to say, the implementation of 
the SRO model requires financial advisers to tutor their clients as they advise them in ‘teachable 
moments’. It also means transferring financial literacy statutory responsibility from ASIC to the 
SROs through reform of the ASIC Act. This evolution is theoretically, culturally and 
organisationally sound, having a scholarly basis in behavioural economics research. It increases the 
financial literacy of the community, and provides the human resources ex ante at the interface when 
and where they are needed. 
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The imposition of statutory fiduciary duty directly in the investment chain has not been 
previously viewed with undiluted pleasure: 
the controversial suggestion … that the duty of directors to their ‘company’ can itself embrace 
some level of fiduciary responsibility to the beneficiaries of a trust of which their company is a 
trustee … is questionable … whether this heralded development in our law is as desirable or 
necessary one in the trust company context.226  
However, ‘superannuation entity director’ is now enshrined in the SIS Act with direct fiduciary 
obligations to the beneficiary,227 and in the Corporations Act228 a best interest duty to MIS 
securities holders. 
As Heydon229 also notes, cultural change to ensure ‘reasonable expectations’230 of fiduciary 
obligations and principles is a generational task. That loyalty to others, enshrined in the general law 
but subsumed by statute and contract, should require reinforcement is a sad reflection on 
Parliament. It is a public policy issue to enforce effective disclosure, require effective conflicts 
avoidance and balance information and vulnerability asymmetries between provider and client.231  
Law reform requires: (a) simplification and harmonisation of the various statutes; and, (b) 
renewed focus on fiduciary principles of propriety, honesty, and uncompromised loyalty. ‘The 
fiduciary obligation is a demanding standard of propriety in conduct that is unequalled elsewhere in 
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the law’,232 requiring ‘complete loyalty to the service of another’s interests’.233 Any discussion of 
law reform needs to comprehend these two themes. The first imperative is better understood by 
reflecting on analysis of international practice in comparable jurisdictions. The second imperative 
will require a national sustained education campaign over a sustained period to inculcate industry 
participants in director, trustee, and officer roles with these fiduciary concepts. Training at 
university level is essential. 
Presently in Australia, comprehension and application of fiduciary principles is not 
widespread, given lip-service, often ignored, eliminated in contract, and subservient to adherence to 
specific statutory provisions. Compliance with the letter of the law but not adherence to its spirit or 
community expectation. Canada and Germany have dealt with this problem applying their 
respective fiduciary and civil law duty of care standards. There is a public policy question as to 
whether Australian statutes ‘adequately protects those to whom the general law would grant 
protection, if enforced, afforded by the fiduciary relationship’.234  
4.5  How Statutes Reduce Regulatory Efficacy: Subsuming of Fiduciary Principles by 
Statutory Accretion  
Empirical analysis demonstrates that the ‘Age of Statutes’235 has not prevented, in any meaningful 
sense, an elimination of systemic problems nor of their cyclical recurrence: they may have added to 
the problem,236 and to judicial frustration.237 Misuse of ‘fiduciary’ the adjective by politicians and 
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lobby groups has resulted in a mismatch of community expectations based on common usage and 
the legal reality of fiduciary law in Australia.238  
Systemic Failure in Australian Law 
 
In many cases, contracts mean that fiduciary expectations are not legitimate…’239 particularly in 
Australian NBFEs. Judicial reticence to interfere in arms-length contracting parties240 where best 
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Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ) citing Paul Dainty Pty Ltd v National Tennis Centre Trust 
(1990) 22 FCR 495, 515–516. 
 




interest of clients are contractually overridden does not assist the vulnerable to mount equitable 
challenges to malfeasance.  
Even where the relationship is contractual (as it normally will be), the matter is too important to 
be left entirely to the agreement of the parties and the interpretation of that agreement … A too 
casual failure to recognise the requirements of a fiduciary position, and sometimes a short 
sighted assumption that all relevant duties are prescribed in contract, can be and has been 
responsible for serious misbehaviour in the financial markets and elsewhere, as shown by many 
litigated cases in the last quarter-century.241 
Assuming that statutory regulation alone can drive market behaviour is problematic. In practice, as 
in Canada and Germany, the intertwined European and national jurisdiction mix of misnamed soft 
law through self-regulation, co-regulation, and government regulation, disciplined by the primacy 
of fiduciary principles and the statutory powers of minority shareholders has resulted in ‘Firms 
begin to avail themselves of corporate governance principles codes, guidelines and laws, thereby 
leaving the “box-ticking” phase behind’.242 This is a salutary lesson for present Australian practice, 
its Corporations Act facilitating creeping corruption in MIS and other NBFEs through box-ticking 
compliance. 
The disconnection between community expectation and legal reality must be addressed. 
Community assumptions of fiduciary obligation of economic loyalty to investors by professional 
persons with whom they deal is not fact. The exposure of the legal reality will mean further 
community anger.  
                                                 
241 Fiduciary Duties of Investment Advisers (Law Commission UK Consultation Paper No 215, 22 October 
2013) 171 citing Peter Watt (ed), Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (Sweet & Maxwell, 19th ed, 2010) 
[6–043]. 
242 Joseph A McCahery and Erik P M Vermuelen, ‘Private Equity and Hedge Fund Activism: Explaining the 
Differences in Regulatory Responses’ (2008) 9 European Business Organization Law Review 535, 537. 
 




4.6  Clarity in Law: Harmonisation of Best Interest Duty 
There are five interpretations of best interest in the Corporations Act243 (Hayne proposes a sixth), 
two in the SIS Act,244 a traditionally lesser duty in the Fair Work (Registered Organisations Act) 
(now amended) as well as general law interpretations, fiduciary or otherwise, which add to the 
confusion.245 Whilst these interpretations are contextual they are, with limited exceptions, 
statutorily undefined. The community, and directors responsible to it in the performance of their 
duties, should not be expected to comprehend these nuances, for the most part determined in the 
general law.246 Whether the superlative ‘best’ has legal meaning at all,247 or whether it raises 
community expectations which are different from their legal basis further confuses present 
Australian law. 
4.7  Hayne and Beyond 
The messages from Hayne, Heydon and the Productivity Commission are very clear. Government 
must act. It must do so strategically, without fear or favour. Only then will trust return, and capital 
flows to those enterprises that need it. Australia is at a cross-roads ― 2019 must be the start of the 
Age of Trust. 
                                                 
243 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 180-4, 601 FC (1), 601 FD (1)(b), 961B(1)(2).  
244 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 ss 52(2), 52(8), VN(a)–(b). 
245 See, eg, ASIC v Australian Property Custodian Holdings Limited (Receivers and Managers appointed) (in 
liquidation) (Controllers appointed) (No 3) [2013] FCA 1342 (12 December 2013) [463] (Murphy J), 
Lewski v ASIC [2016] FCAFC 96 [347] (Greenwood, Middleton, and Foster JJ); Lewski v ASIC (No 2) 
[2017] FCAFC 171 [190] (Greenwood, Middleton, and Foster JJ) [‘Prime Trust’].  
246 See, eg, Millhouse (n 1) ch 1 s 11. 
247 David Pollard, ‘The Short-form “Best Interests Duty” ― Mad, Bad and Dangerous to Know: Part 1 ― 
Background, Cowan v Scargull and MNRPF’ (2018) 32(2) Trust Law International 106 cited in M 
Scott Donald, Submission to Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and 
Financial Services Industry (21 September 2018) [3]. 
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